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Abstract
Agents are asked to rank two objects in a setting where effort
is costly and agents differ in quality (which is the probabil-
ity that they can identify the correct, ground truth, ranking).
We study simple output-agreement mechanisms that pay an
agentinthecasesheagreeswiththereportofanother, andpo-
tentially penalizes for disagreement through a negative pay-
ment. Assuming access to a quality oracle, able to determine
whether an agent’s quality is above a given threshold, we de-
sign a payment scheme that aligns incentives so that agents
whose quality is above this threshold participate and invest
effort. Precluding negative payments leads the expected cost
of this quality-oracle mechanism to increase by a factor of
2 to 5 relative to allowing both positive and negative pay-
ments. Dropping the assumption about access to a quality
oracle, we further show that negative payments can be used
to make agents with quality lower than the quality threshold
choose to not to participate, while those above continue to
participate and invest effort. Through the appropriate choice
of payments, any design threshold can be achieved. This self-
selection mechanism has the same expected cost as the cost-
minimal quality-oracle mechanism, and thus when using the
self-selection mechanism, perfect screening comes for free.
Introduction
We study simple output-agreement mechanisms in a setting
in which agents are presented with two items that they are
asked to rank. An example of such a setting are human rel-
evance judgments for search engine results. Here, users are
presented two websites together with a search query and are
asked to report which of those two is better-suited for the
given query. This is used to determine whether a change
in the search engine’s ranking algorithm improved the qual-
ity of the results and, if so, by how much. In another ex-
ample, the items are suggestions what the New York City
Mayor’s Ofﬁce could do to make New York a greener city.1
In this wiki survey (Salganik and Levy 2012), people were
presented two different suggestions and were asked to vote
which of the two they found more convincing.
Copyright c  2013, Association for the Advancement of Artiﬁcial
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It is important to point out the incentive problems in these
settings. In the latter, the truthfulness of reports may be a
concern. A New York shop owner, for example, might agree
that it makes the city cleaner having to charge customers
25 cents for each plastic bag they use, but she may also
have a vested interest not to vote for this cause because it
is bad for business. The primary incentive issue, however,
is encouraging participants to invest costly effort in order to
obtain information in the ﬁrst place. In the New York set-
ting, for example, people need to understand the issue ﬁrst
and then form an opinion about the presented options. In
the human relevance judgments setting, it takes effort click-
ing on the websites, having a closer look at each, and then
weighing which of the two is better suited for a given query.
Faced with a payment scheme that does not address this is-
sue properly (such as a ﬁxed-price scheme that pays a con-
stant amount per reported ranking), workers would maxi-
mize their hourly wage not by investing effort but by ran-
domly clicking through each task quickly.
State-of-the-art peer prediction mechanisms do not ad-
dress costly effort properly. The original peer prediction
methodbyMiller, ResnickandZeckhauser(2005)canincor-
porate costly effort but this proper scaling of payments re-
lies on the assumption that the agents’ belief model is com-
mon knowledge, which which seems unreasonable in prac-
tice. More recent mechanisms (Prelec 2004; Jurca and Falt-
ings2006;2007;2009;WitkowskiandParkes2012a;2012b;
Radanovic and Faltings 2013) relax the assumption that the
designer knows agent belief models, but lose through these
relaxations the ability to know how to appropriately scale
payment incentives. Moreover, none of these mechanisms
support settings in which agents differ in their abilities. Re-
call the earlier example of the use of a wiki survey. Depend-
ing on the choices, a user can be either very knowledge-
able or clueless as to which will best improve New York
City’s environment. The same holds true for human rele-
vance judgments to improve search engine quality: depend-
ing on the query that is presented, a worker may or may not
know how to evaluate a website based on that query.
Most closely related to the present paper is the work by
Dasgupta and Ghosh (2013). Their paper is situated in a
very similar model for information elicitation with unknownground truth where agents have individual qualities, deﬁned
just as in our model. While even simple output-agreement
mechanisms induce a truthful equilibrium in this model,
their key contribution is to develop a technique for elimi-
nating other, unwanted equilibria. In a brief treatment, they
comment that costly effort could be incentivized by scaling
payments and that the qualities could be obtained by pre-
screening; e.g., through qualiﬁcation tests.
In this paper, we ﬁrst formalize this idea, and then use the
resulting mechanism as a baseline with which to compare
our mechanism, which is shown to have signiﬁcantly lower
cost and does not require the ability to screen participants.
Rather, participants will self-select into the mechanism ac-
cording to their quality. It is beyond the scope of this paper
how to optimally choose the implicit quality threshold, but
we note here that this trades off quality, cost and number of
reports: a higher threshold results in higher expected quality
of reports and lower expected cost per report but also more
agents passing and thus fewer reports.
The key property of an effort-incentivizing mechanism is
that the expected payment of an agent who has invested ef-
fort to observe an informative signal is higher than the ex-
pected payment of an uninformed (guessing) agent by at
least the cost of effort. This property is difﬁcult to ensure in
peerpredictionsettingswhereanagent’spriorbeliefsareun-
known to the mechanism because the expectation is formed
with those unknown beliefs. Without any lower bounds on
the extent of an agent’s belief change from uninformed to
informed, there always exist possible prior beliefs for which
agents are not properly incentivized to invest effort. When
such an uninformed agent is used as peer for another agent,
thisleadstoasecond-orderproblembecausethatotheragent
then no longer has an incentive to invest effort either.
We present two approaches to avoid this unraveling of in-
centives due to costly effort. We initially assume that the
mechanism has access to an external quality oracle, and can
preclude an agent from participating if her quality is below
some design threshold. The second approach does not rely
on this assumption. It avoids the aforementioned unravel-
ing by explicitly modelling that an agent may choose not to
participate in the mechanism. This “pass” action provides
an outside option with utility zero and the mechanism’s (po-
tentially negative) payments are then designed such that un-
informed agents or agents whose qualities are too low are
better off passing than guessing. An agent whose quality is
high enough, however, is better off investing effort knowing
that her peer will also be informed and of high quality in
equilibrium because only those participate in the ﬁrst place.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
the ﬁrst part, we develop a baseline through an assumption
of access to a quality oracle. We design payments that in-
centivize every agent with high enough quality to invest ef-
fort, and compare the expected cost of the mechanism that is
constrained to use only non-negative payments to an uncon-
strained mechanism. For a uniform distribution on quality,
we ﬁnd that allowing for negative payments results in an ex-
pected cost 2 to 5 times lower than in the case where one
can use only non-negative payments, with the cost improve-
ment depending on the chosen quality threshold. In the sec-
ond part, we then drop the assumption of access to a quality
oracle, and show how to induce agents to self-select based
on quality. This self-selection mechanism has the same ex-
pected cost as the quality-oracle mechanism that uses nega-
tive payments and thus admits the same, favorable cost ratio.
In other words: when using our mechanism, perfect screen-
ing of agents comes for free.
The Basic Model
There are two items A and B with true order A  B; a
situation that we also describe as “A is best.” Each agent in
a sequence of agents is presented with the items in a random
order. From the perspective of a given agent i, we denote the
items Ai and Bi. For example, imagine that item Ai is the
item presented on the left and Bi the item presented on the
right, and that the decision which item, A or B, is presented
on the left side, is made uniformly at random. Due to the
random bijection from items fA;Bg to an agent’s subjective
labels fAi;Big, the prior belief of agent i is that Pr(Ai 
Bi) = 0:5.
Agent i has the option of investing effort to observe a
noisy signal i about the true order of the items. In par-
ticular, agent i has a quality qi, which is drawn uniformly on
[0:5;1]. The distribution on quality is common knowledge,
but each agent’s quality is private. The cost of effort C > 0
is assumed to be identical for every agent, and also common
knowledge. If agent i invests effort, the signal she receives
is the true order with probability qi; otherwise she receives
the wrong order. In our analysis, it is convenient to trans-
form quality qi 2 [0:5;1] to normalized quality xi 2 [0;1],
so that qi = (1 + xi)=2 and xi uniform on [0;1].
We study mechanisms that match each agent i with an-
other agent j. Agent j is said to be the peer of agent i. For
example, agent j can be the agent following agent i in the
sequence or agent j can be chosen randomly. Agent i can
also be agent j’s peer but this need not be the case. We
study output agreement mechanisms for which agent i re-
ceives payment a > C > 0 if her report agrees with that
of peer agent j and d < a otherwise. The main focus is
to consider the impact of allowing d < 0. The payments in
the case of agreement and disagreement are common knowl-
edge.
An agent ﬁrst decides whether to “participate” or “pass,”
given knowledge of her quality qi. If she passes, she re-
ceives zero payment. If she participates, her strategic choice
is whether to invest effort or not, and then to reportAi 0
i Bi
or Bi 0
i Ai to the mechanism. The report 0
i of agent i is
mapped by the mechanism to a claim that item A is best or
that item B is best, so that when we say that the report is
A 0
i B this should be understood to mean that the agent’s
report on Ai and Bi was mapped to mean A 0
i B. Only a
participating agent can be chosen to be the peer of agent i.
If only one agent participates, we deﬁne the expected pay-
ment for this agent to be the payment she would obtain if
matched against a peer who guesses; i.e., her expected pay-
ment is (a + d)=2.
To allow for negative payments in practice, we can imag-
ine that the broader context requires holding at least  d >0 as collateral for every agent who is interested in participat-
ing; i.e. to ask for this collateral payment upfront.
Single-Agent Perspective
In this section, we analyze the set of possible best responses
of an agent. We will need this in later sections when we
analyze the equilibria of our mechanisms. We also refer to
Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of the game from agent
i’s perspective.
Agent not Investing Effort
Consider an agent who chooses to participate but not invest
effort. Because items Ai and Bi are in a random bijection to
A and B, the random mapping will, independent the agent’s
report, result in reports A 0
i B and B 0
i A with equal
probability from the agent’s perspective. For example, no
matter if the agent always reports Ai 0
i Bi, always reports
Bi 0
i Ai, or if she reports Ai 0
i Bi with some probability,
the agent’s belief about the effect of these reports is that it
is equally likely to be A 0
i B or B 0
i A. In the same
way, the effect is that an agent who does not invest effort
will think it is equally likely that peer agent j’s report will
correspond to Ai 0
j Bi or Bi 0
j Ai (with respect to agent
i’s item space). That is, the belief of agent i in regard to the
report of her peer is Pr(Ai 0
j Bi) = 0:5. For this reason,
any uninformed reporting strategy comes down to guessing
uniformly with agent i receiving expected utility
Ui(guess) =
a + d
2
(1)
for any report of her peer j.
Recall that the utility from not participating (i.e. from
passing) is assumed to be zero:
Ui(pass) = 0: (2)
Lemma 1 describes the primary effect of the mechanism
parameters on the agents’ equilibrium play:
Lemma1. Whetherpassingdominatesguessingdependson
payments a and d:
1. If d >  a, then Ui(guess) > Ui(pass).
2. If d <  a, then Ui(pass) > Ui(guess).
Proof. Ui(guess) = a+d
2 > 0 = Ui(pass) , d >  a
(second case analogous).
For d =  a, agents are indifferent between passing and
guessing. Whether passing dominates guessing or vice versa
is one major difference between the two mechanisms ana-
lyzed later in this paper.
Agent Investing Effort
First observe that Lemma 1 still holds after investing effort,
butthatinvestingeffortfollowedbyguessingorpassingcan-
not be part of any equilibrium because an agent can only
incur cost and thus lose utility through investing effort fol-
lowed by guess or pass.
Having invested effort, an agent can now follow more in-
formed reporting strategies. The truth strategy reports the
true signal received. The counter strategy reports the oppo-
site order to the one received. Many other reporting strate-
gies are available. For example, agent i can report Ai 0
i Bi
with probability p > 0:5 if her signal is Ai i Bi and re-
port Bi 0
i Ai otherwise. Lemma 2 says that these other
reporting strategies following a decision to invest effort are
not part of any equilibrium:
Lemma 2. If investing effort is part of a best response for
an agent, then the reporting strategies “truth” or “counter”
strictly dominate all other strategies.
Proof. Since C > 0, and given that investing effort is part
of a best response, the expected utility from investing effort
must be higher than guessing. Therefore, the probability of
agreement conditioned on at least one signal must be greater
than 0.5. Before investing effort, the agent’s subjective be-
lief on j’s report is Pr(Ai 0
j Bi) = 0:5. Now suppose that
this belief does not change after observing Ai i Bi, i.e.
Pr(Ai 0
j BijAi i Bi) = 0:5. This would then mean that
Pr(Ai 0
j BijBi i Ai) = 0:5 as well since
Pr(Ai 0
j BijAi i Bi)  Pr(Ai i Bi)
+Pr(Ai 0
j BijBi i Ai)  Pr(Bi i Ai)
=Pr(Ai 0
j Bi) = 0:5:
(3)
But then agent i’s subjective belief about the probability of
agreement remains unchanged and we have a contradiction.
Therefore, we must have Pr(Ai 0
j BijAi i Bi) 6= 0:5.
Suppose Pr(Ai 0
j BijAi i Bi) > 0:5 and so Pr(Ai 0
j
BijBi i Ai) < 0:5 (follows from Equation 3). Because
of this, given signal Ai i Bi, the agent’s unique best re-
sponse is to report Ai 0
i Bi and given signal Bi i Ai her
unique best response is to report Bi 0
i Ai. In each case,
this “truth” strategydominates any other strategy including a
mixed strategy. Similarly, if Pr(Ai 0
j BijAi i Bi) < 0:5
and so Pr(Ai 0
j BijBi i Ai) > 0:5, then the “counter”
strategy dominates any other strategy.
Given Lemma 2, it is helpful to deﬁne the action ai to suc-
cinctly represent all potential equilibrium play of an agent
who chooses to participate. This action is deﬁned as fol-
lows:
ai =
( xi , if invest effort and report truth
 xi , if invest effort and report counter
0 , if no effort, and guess.
(4)
Suppose, for example, that both agent i and her peer agent
invest effort and report truthfully. Agent i’s expected utility,Agent i
0
pass
a+d
2
ai = 0 (guess)
a+d
2   a d
2 xiaj   C
ai =  xi (“counter”)
a+d
2 + a d
2 xiaj C
ai = xi (“truth”)
invest effort
participate
Figure 1: An illustration of agent i’s decisions within the
game. Note that agent i is always matched to a participating
agent j.
given normalized qualities xi and xj, is:
Ui(ai = xi;aj = xj) =

1 + xi
2

1 + xj
2

a
+

1   xi
2

1   xj
2

a
+

1 + xi
2

1   xj
2

d
+

1   xi
2

1 + xj
2

d   C
=
a + d
2
+
a   d
2
xixj   C;
(5)
where the ﬁrst line is from both agreeing on the correct or-
der, the second line is from both agreeing on the incorrect
order, the third line is from agent i being correct but agent j
being wrong, and the fourth line from agent i being wrong
and agent j being correct.
On the other hand, if both invest effort but agent i plays
truth and her peer plays counter, then a and d are simply
exchanged, and:
Ui(ai = xi;aj =  xj) =
a + d
2
 
(a   d)
2
xixj   C:
(6)
Suppose both were to invest effort and play counter. In
this case, we again have:
Ui(ai =  xi;aj =  xj) =
a + d
2
+
a   d
2
xixj   C:
(7)
Note also thatif agent i invests effort, whileher peer agent
guesses, then her expected utility is just,
Ui(ai = xi;aj = 0) =
a + d
2
  C: (8)
Combining Equations 5–8, we then have the following
lemma:
Lemma 3. The expected utility for a participating agent
with normalized quality xi who takes action ai 2
f xi;+xig is:
Ui(ai) =
a + d
2
+
a   d
2
 ai  E[aj j sj]   C; (9)
where E[aj j sj] is the expected value of the action of peer
agent j and where sj denotes her strategy.
The expectation is taken with respect to the distribution
on qualities of agents, any mixing in agent strategies, and
the random process that deﬁnes an agent’s signal. Follow-
ing effort by agent i, her strategic interaction with the other
agents is precisely captured through E[aj j sj], and Equa-
tion 9 fully captures agent i’s expected utility following ef-
fort.
Quality-Oracle Mechanism
In this section, we analyze mechanisms with d >  a and
access to a quality oracle. In the next section, we will then
see that the right choice of d <  a induces agents to
self-select according to quality so that the mechanism no
longer needs a quality oracle. The distinction between the
cases d >  a and d <  a comes from Lemma 1.
For d >  a, one needs some form of external quality
screening because guessing strictly dominates passing, so
that, without screening, every agent would participate and
report something with low-quality agents guessing instead
of investing effort and reporting truthfully. Knowing that
some peer agents will guess, higher-quality agents would
then also guess, leading to an unraveling of incentives and
noise in the reported signals.
Deﬁnition 1. For any qualiﬁcation threshold x > 0, a
mechanism with access to a quality oracle knows for every
agent i whether normalized quality xi  x or xi < x.
In the remainder of this section, we assume the mecha-
nism has access to a quality oracle, and uses this to only
allow an agent to participate if her (normalized) quality is
xi  x > 0, for some threshold x.
When ground truth data is available for some item pair-
ings, qualiﬁcation tests can be used as an approximation for
a quality oracle. Qualiﬁcation tests ask every agent for re-
ports about k item pairings for which the mechanism knows
ground truth. Based on this, only those agents who agree
with the ground truth on at least a fraction x > 0 of their re-
ports are allowed to participate. Of course, such a qualiﬁca-
tion test provides only an approximate quality oracle. With
k = 10 trials and a qualiﬁcation threshold of x = 0:6 (cor-
responding to q = 0:8), for example, a qualiﬁcation test al-
lows an agent with xi = 0:2 (corresponding to qi = 0:6) to
participate with 16:73% probability despite xi < x. Simi-
larly, an agent with xi = 0:7 (corresponding to qi = 0:85)
misses the qualiﬁcation bar with 17:98% probability. Due to
the law of large numbers, these mis-classiﬁcations disappear
for k ! 1, so that a test with k ! 1 trials approaches the
behavior of an oracle.An Effort-Inducing Equilibrium in the
Quality-Oracle Mechanism
Theorem 4. With a   d > 4C
(x)2+x and d >  a, the
mechanism with access to a quality oracle induces a strict
Bayes-Nash equilibrium where every agent allowed to par-
ticipate chooses to participate, invests effort, and reports
truthfully.
Proof. Consider an agent i who is allowed to participate af-
ter the mechanism asked the quality oracle, and assume all
other agents who are allowed to participate invest effort and
report truthfully. It is then a necessary and sufﬁcient con-
dition for the statement to be true that agent i’s unique best
response is to also invest effort and report truthfully. We use
Equation 9 for which we ﬁrst need to compute E[aj j sj]:
E[ajjsj] = E[xjjxj  x] =
1
1   x
Z 1
xj=x
xj dxj =
1 + x
2
Observe that the quality distribution for peer agent j is now
uniform on [x;1].
Since d >  a, we know from Lemma 1 that passing is
strictly dominated by guessing, so that in every equilibrium
agent i is always participating. From Lemma 2 we know
that only ai 2 f xi;0;+xig can be best responses of an
agent that participates. Now since E[ajjsj] = 1+x

2 > 0
and xi  x > 0, by Equation 9, ai =  xi cannot be
part of a best response either. It then remains to determine
the values a;d with d >  a for which an agent i with
quality xi = x is better off playing ai = xi than ai = 0 by
setting Ui(ai = x) > Ui(ai = 0):
a + d
2
+
a   d
2
 x  E[ajjsj]   C >
a + d
2
,
a   d
2

x(1 + x)
2
> C , a   d >
4C
(x)2 + x:
This completes the proof.
As always in peer prediction, this equilibrium is not
unique (e.g., Waggoner and Chen, 2013). In particular, all
agents guessing is also an equilibrium.
Expected Cost of Quality-Oracle Mechanism
Now that we know the constraint on a and d such that for
a given quality threshold x, there is a Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium where all agents with quality higher than the threshold
invest effort and are truthful, how should payments a and
d be set to minimize the expected cost given C and x?
For each agent who participates, the expected cost in the
truth equilibrium of the quality-oracle mechanism is given
by
E[cost for participating agent]
=
a + d
2
+
a   d
2

x + 1
2

x + 1
2
=
a + d
2
+
a   d
2

(x + 1)2
4
=
1
2
(a + d) +
(x + 1)2
8
(a   d):
(10)
Given this, the optimization problem to ﬁnd the cost-
minimizing mechanism parameters becomes:
minimize
1
2
(a + d) +
(x + 1)2
8
(a   d)
s.t. a   d >
4C
(x)2 + x
a + d > 0
(11)
The remainder of the section is organized as follows.
We ﬁrst solve this optimization problem, and then impose
the additional requirement of non-negative payments, i.e.
d  0. Having done this, we quantify how much more
the mechanism has to pay in expectation because of this re-
striction.
Allowing for Negative Payments. We solve the optimiza-
tion problem as given in (11) using a variable change. Let
a =  +  and d =     for new variables  and .
Substituting into (11) and solving the optimization problem
immediately gives  = 2C=
 
(x)2 + x
+ , and  = ,
with  > 0 and  ! 0. Substituting again for a and d, we
obtain the cost-minimizing mechanism parameters:
a =
2C
(x)2 + x +  (12)
and
d =  
2C
(x)2 + x: (13)
Given this, the expected cost to the mechanism for each
agent who chooses to participate is
E[minimal cost for participating agentjd >  a]
=
1
2
(a + d) +
(x + 1)2
8
(a   d)
=
1
2
() +
(x + 1)2
8

4C
(x)2 + x + 

;
(14)
and for  ! 0, we have:
lim
!0
E[minimal cost for participating agentjd >  a]
=
(x + 1)2
8

4C
(x)2 + x =
(x)2 + 2x + 1
2(x)2 + 2x C
=

1
2x +
1
2

C:
(15)
Requiring Non-negative Payments. Let’s now suppose
that we seek to minimize the expected cost of the quality-
oracle mechanism subject to d  0. The second constraint
in (11) is always satisﬁed with d  0. We now argue that it
must be that d = 0 in an optimal solution. Assume this was
not the case, so that d = y for some y > 0. Then the left-
hand side of the ﬁrst constraint can be kept at the same level
by setting d := 0 and a := a   y, which would lower
the ﬁrst part of the objective function and leave the secondpart unchanged. So for minimal non-negative payments, we
require:
d = 0 (16)
After inserting d = 0 back into the optimization prob-
lem, we have
a =
4C
(x)2 + x +  (17)
with  ! 0. Based on this, the expected cost to the mecha-
nism for each agent who chooses to participate is
E[minimal cost for participating agentjd  0]
=
1
2
(a + d) +
(x + 1)2
8
(a   d)
=
(x)2 + 2x + 5
8

4C
(x)2 + x + 

(18)
and for  ! 0, we have:
lim
!0
E[minimal cost for participating agentjd  0]
=
(x)2 + 2x + 5
8

4C
(x)2 + x + 

=
(x)2 + 2x + 5
2(x)2 + 2x C:
(19)
Relative Cost of Requiring Non-Negative Payments.
Clearly, constraining the mechanism’s payments to be non-
negative can only increase the expected cost (ﬁxing the cost
to agents for effort C and the design parameter x above
which agents will choose to participate and invest effort).
But how much more expensive is it when the mechanism is
restricted to only use non-negative payments? Recall that in
both cases we insist that agents must have an incentive to
participate, i.e. the expected utility for an agent who partici-
pates remains non-negative.
Theorem 5. Fixing quality threshold x, the expected cost
of the cost-optimized quality-oracle mechanism increases by
a factor of
4
(x + 1)2 + 1
when constraining the mechanism to non-negative payments
a;d  0. This is an increase between 2 (for x ! 1) and
5 (for x ! 0).
Proof. The result follows from dividing Equation 19 by
Equation 15:
lim!0 E[minimal cost for participating agentjd  0]
lim!0 E[minimal cost for participating agentjd >  a]
=
(x
)
2+2x
+5
2(x)2+2x C
(x)2+2x+1
2(x)2+2x C
=
(x)2 + 2x + 5
(x)2 + 2x + 1
=
(x + 1)2 + 4
(x + 1)2 =
4
(x + 1)2 + 1
(20)
Since (x+1)2 is strictly increasing in x, the term 4=(x+
1)2 + 1 is strictly decreasing. The statement follows after
inserting x = 0 and x = 1.
Self-Selection Mechanism
In this section, we drop the assumption that the mechanism
has access to a quality oracle. At the same time, we consider
the effect of setting d <  a so that passing dominates
guessing (Lemma 1). The main result is that we identify a
natural equilibrium in which agents self-select according to
their quality xi, such that every agent over quality threshold
x invests effort and is truthful, and every agent below the
threshold is passing.
There are several advantages of self selection when com-
pared to qualiﬁcation tests: ﬁrst, qualiﬁcation tests are qual-
ity oracles only with inﬁnitely many samples. Second, they
are wasteful because agents need to be paid for test ques-
tions to which the answer is already known. Third, self
selection is more ﬂexible than qualiﬁcation tests in that it
readily adapts to changes in the nature of tasks without any
re-testing. In the human relevance judgments setting, for ex-
ample, the quality of an agent does not have to be ﬁxed but
can depend on the given search query. Finally, self selection
does not require any ground truth data.
An Effort-Inducing Equilibrium in the
Self-Selection Mechanism
Let si(xi) denote the strategy that maps agent i’s quality
type xi to her action (e.g. “pass” or “guess”).
Theorem 6. With d <  a, the mechanism without access
to a quality oracle induces a Bayes-Nash equilibrium where
every agent i plays the following strategy:
si(xi) =

invest effort and report truthfully; if xi  x
pass; if xi < x
where
x =
s
9
4
 
4(a   C)
a   d
 
1
2
:
For an agent with xi 6= x this is a strict best response.
Proof. It is sufﬁcient to show that given peer agent j plays
sj(xj), it is a best response of agent i to play si(xi), and
the unique best response if xi 6= x. Inserting sj(xj) into
Equation 9, E[aj j sj] is identical to its value in the quality-
oracle mechanism:
E[ajjsj] = E[xjjxj  x] =
1
1   x
Z 1
xj=x
xj dxj =
1 + x
2
:
By Lemma 1, we know that passing strictly dominates
guessing, so in order to determine the indifference point be-
tween passing and investing effort followed by truthful re-
porting, we set Ui(ai = x) = Ui(pass) = 0 and obtain
a + d
2
+
a   d
2
 x  E[ajjsj]   C = 0
,
a + d
2
+
(a   d)(x(1 + x))
4
  C = 0
, x + (x)2 = 2  
4(a   C)
a   d
, x = 
s
9
4
 
4(a   C)
a   d
 
1
2
:
(21)First observe that
4(a C)
a d > 0 because a > C. Now,
a  C < a and a  d > 2a since  d > a. Therefore,
it holds that 4(a   C)=(a   d) < 4a=2a = 2 and so
only the positive solution of the square root is within the
[0;1] bounds for x. Strictness for xi 6= x follows from
Equation 9 strictly increasing with ai for E[aj j sj] > 0.
Expected Cost of Self-Selection Mechanism
Since agent j’s equilibrium play is the same as in the pre-
vious section, so is the equation for the expected cost of
the mechanism (Equation 10). For the self-selection mech-
anism, the difference is that the equilibrium conditions do
not allow the same simple analysis as for the quality-oracle
mechanism to ﬁnd the cost-minimal payments because the
equilibrium condition from Theorem 6 do not have the same
simple structure as those from Theorem 4. We thus insert
the equilibrium condition into Equation 10 and obtain (the
second line in Equation 22 is derived from the second line
in Equation 21):
E[cost for participating agent]
=
a + d
2
+
a   d
2

(x + 1)2
4
=
a + d
2
+
2C   (a + d)
x + (x)2 
(x + 1)2
4
=
a + d
2
+
(x + 1)
 
2C   (a + d)

4x
=
a + d
2
 
(a + d)(x + 1)
4x +
2C(x + 1)
4x
=
a + d
2
 
a + d
2

1
2
+
1
2x

+
C
2
+
C
2x   C + C
=
a + d
2

1
2
 
1
2x

  C

1
2
 
1
2x

+ C
=

a + d
2
  C

1
2
 
1
2x

+ C
=

C  
a + d
2

1
2x  
1
2

+ C
(22)
Both factors of the ﬁrst part of this equation are always
positive for d <  a and x 2 (0;1). Fixing x, the min-
imal payments are thus setting d =  a    with  > 0
and  ! 0, so that (a + d)=2 ! 0. Setting d =  a   
leaves us with one degree of freedom, and a can still be
used to implement any x, since
lim
!0
4(a   C)
a   d
= lim
!0
4(a   C)
2a + 
= 2  
2C
a
;
so that
x :=
s
9
4
 

2  
2C
a

 
1
2
=
r
1
4
+
2C
a
 
1
2
; (23)
canbesettoanyvaluebetween0and1. SolvingEquation23
for a, we thus obtain the cost-minimal payments
a =
2C
(x)2 + x
and
d =  
2C
(x)2 + x   :
For  ! 0, these are identical to the cost-minimal pay-
ments of the quality-oracle mechanism with d >  a.
Therefore, the self-selection mechanism with d <  a has
the same expected cost, with the added beneﬁt of obtain-
ing perfect screening through self-selection. Theorem 7 then
follows immediately:
Theorem 7. For ﬁxed quality threshold x, the expected
cost of the cost-optimized self-selection mechanism is lower
than the expected cost of the cost-optimized quality-oracle
mechanism constrained to non-negative payments by a fac-
tor of
4
(x + 1)2 + 1:
In light of this, we believe that practitioners should
strongly consider allowing negative payments: they signif-
icantly lower the cost for effort-incentivizing peer predic-
tion mechanisms and provide a free way to perfectly screen
based on quality in equilibrium.
Conclusions
We have presented an analysis of simple output-agreement
mechanisms for incentivizing effort and providing screen-
ing for worker quality. In closing, we emphasize two main
points:
First, peer prediction with effort incentives is expensive
if simple output agreement can only use non-negative pay-
ments. For example, with effort cost C > 0 and a qual-
ity threshold of q = 0:8 (i.e., designing for only the top
40% of quality in the market), the expected cost for the cost-
minimal, non-negative-payment output-agreement mecha-
nism is 3:4C. Allowing for negative payments, the expected
cost for the mechanism decreases to 1:3C. This improve-
ment occurs even if the designer has access to a way to per-
fectly screen for the quality of participants and comes about
through maintaining the differential incentive for agreement
over disagreement, while reducing the expected payment so
that agents with quality at the threshold are just indifferent
between participation and not.
In addition to lower expected cost on behalf of the mech-
anism, choosing negative payments in a way that they dis-
incentivize guessing induces an equilibrium where agents
self-select according to the selection criterion—in effect,
perfect screening comes for free. We do not believe that this
principle is restricted to selection for quality. For example,
it could also be applied when all participants have the same
quality but differ in cost, and agents self-select according to
cost.
In markets with task competition, an agent’s outside op-
tion may not be to pass and obtain utility zero but to work on
another task with positive expected utility. For such a com-
petitive setting, we conjecture that the relative cost beneﬁt
of negative payments decreases but that incentivizing agents
with low quality to pass still has the beneﬁt that it induces
agents to self select according to their qualities.Regarding the practicality of our approach, we think it
is useful to separate the assumptions made for the analysis
(such as the uniform prior on the agents’ quality) and the
simplicity (and thus practical robustness) of simple output-
agreement mechanisms. In practice, a designer only needs
to set two parameters, agreement payment a and disagree-
ment payment d, and this could be achieved adaptively. Our
main theoretical results suggest the opportunity for signiﬁ-
cant cost savings, along with screening of agents according
to quality through self selection.
There are several interesting directions for future work.
First, it would be interesting to evaluate our mechanisms
experimentally. Second, we plan to extend our analysis to
more sophisticated belief models where an agent may be-
lieve that she holds a minority opinion after investing effort.
This is currently precluded by the way an agent’s quality
is modeled because after investing effort, an agent observes
ground truth with probability larger than 50%. In particu-
lar, we intend to study effort incentives for peer-prediction
mechanisms that are not just simple output agreement, such
as the robust Bayesian truth serum (Witkowski and Parkes
2012a). Finally, combining machine learning models with
peer prediction is an interesting direction, presenting poten-
tial applications across multiple domains. One interesting
area of application is peer grading in massively open on-
line courses (MOOCs) where students grade other students’
assignments. The machine learning work by (Piech et al.
2013) learns each grader’s quality and bias from Coursera2
data with some success but ignores effort incentives for ac-
curate grading. We believe that incorporating proper incen-
tives for effort similar to the techniques of this paper will
increase the performance of these algorithms.
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